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Returo to Rhetoric 
A Case For Co-operative Discussion 
M, SUSAN POWER 
Arkansas State University 
I 
Introduction 
Many contemporary students of democracy, normative or empirical, 
analyze the concepts of majority rule, equality, and representation. But 
Sir Ernest Barker writes in his translation of Aristotle's Politics: 
It is thus not an unfair gloss to suggest that Aristotle by implication 
assumes that the dialectic of debate is the final foundation of the 
principle of popular government, in so far as he accepts that prin-
ciple. In other words, democracy is based upon discussion. 1 
Today the idea that discussion constitutes the primary characteristic of 
democracy initially strikes the mind as either paradoxical or misguided. 
Many persons think free elections and majority rule are the centr ·al fea-
tures of democracy. However, I wish to explore various views of the 
intenelationship between the concepts of decentralized democracies, 
modes of discussion, and types of ethical standards . We are seeking to 
explicate a correlation between ethical standards, ,decentralized democ-
racies and policy decisions made by means of various discussion proc-
esses. In order to simplify the problem, the multiplicity of possible views 
have been reduced to two major positions. I have labeled them the mod-
ern individualistic and ancient, communal philosophies. Writers support-
ing both points of view prefer a decentralized democratic governmental 
system in contrast to a centralized, bureaucratic or tyrannical system and 
challenge their opponents with the assertion that the adoption of their 
adversaiies position will produce destruction of freedom, or autocratic, 
centralized government. In brief, the modern individualistic group ad-
hers to an ethic of economic or self-interest, decentralized ,democracy and 
pa1tisan discussion; whereas the second position, the ancient commu-
nalism advocates, value the common good, decentralized democracy and 
co-operative discussion. If democracy presupposes discussion, what type 
of ethical system best conesponds with it, modern, possessive-individu-
1 Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1962) , p. 126. 
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alism or some form of a consensual creed in which the common good is 
a key principle? In other words, can a decentralized political system work 
in which there are no common ethical criteria except econom ic or in-
dividual self-interest? Another relate d issue is whether a decentra lized 
democratic system best corresponds with a communal-consensual ethical 
system in which policy decisions are made by means of co-operative dis-
cussion or with a system in which decisions are a balance of self-interest. 
More specifically, in order to discuss these problems in greater detail in 
this essay I have chosen to contras t some classical theorists with a few 
advocates of modern possessive indivi dualism. 2 First, the case tha t par-
tisan discussion and individualism b est correspond with decentra lized 
democracy is stated. Then the posi tion of the proponents of coopera tive 
discussion is summarized. In conclusion, I present and defen d the th esis 
that cooperative discussion along the lines advocated by the classical 
Greek theorists most adequately corresponds with decentralize d demo-
cratic government. 
II 
Modern Indivi dualism 
Modern individualism is a maj or economic and political tra dition. 
Some insist that its roots are found in Adam Smith's Wealt h of Nations, 
and Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. 3 In "Margina l Notes on Reading Politi-
cal Philosophy," James M. Buchanan says philosophical indivi du alism 
which he associates with Hume, Locke and Kant, bases politica l obliga-
tion on self-interest and conventional rules of conduct. Here, indivi duals 
make decisions and the state derives from rational calculations of self-
interest .4 In America John C. Calhoun and William Graham Sumner 
expoun ded varieties of this philosophy. Two recent works within this 
tradition, Anthony Down's An Economic Theory of Democracy ,and 
2 C. B. McPherson, The Political Theory af Possessive Individualism: Hobbes 
To Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) p. 273. McPherson reduces 
the liberal-individualist tradition to seven assumptions. He recognizes that within an 
individualistically based society there is a serious problem with maintenance of social 
cohesion. "The further condition is that there be a cohesion of self-interests, among 
all those who have a voice in choosing the government, sufficient to offset centrifug al 
forces of a possessive market society. This constitution was fulfilled, in the heyday of 
the market society, by the fact that a political voice was restricted to a possessing class 
which had sufficient cohesion to decide periodically , without anarchy, who should 
have the sovereign power . As long as this condition was fulfilled there was a sufficient 
basis for an autonomous theory of obligation of the individual to a constitutional lib-
eral state." 
3 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy ( New York; Harpe r and 
Row, 1957), p. 27. 
4 James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of 
Michigan , 1965), pp . 314, 315, 316. 
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Charles Lindblom's The Intelligence of Democracy will be considered 
here. 
Anthony Downs asks what motivates men to pursue political careers 
and what constitutes rational political decisions. Rationality and realism 
require that one make the assumption men pursue their own interest in 
order to obtain income, prestige and power. 5 Only individuals have ends/ 
goals, and there is no such tibing as a common good or general welfare for 
the community.6 Yet, Downs asserts communal consensus or some form 
of conventional standards are necessary. The problem emerges of how 
they ,are to be fo1mulated given the prior assertion of the non-existence of 
a common good. According to Downs a stable democracy cannot exist 
without extensive ideological consensus. A democratic government would 
not be effective in a conflict ridden community divided into two equal 
camps because this would produce stalemate. He thinks democracy both 
presupposes and requires consensus about goals but not perfect agree-
ment. 7 Thus Downs thinks the self-interested individual must seek satis-
faction within the ethical constraints imposed by conventional, consen-
sual norms or the Judeo-Christian morality. The problem of how serious 
differences over such issues ,as, for example, state funding of birth control 
measures would be handled, is not resolved. In other words, this individ-
ual consent model is only viable with the assumption added that policy 
decisions are con£ned within the boundaries of conventional Chiistianity 
and not extended to those controversial areas which divide Chiistians. 
Charles Lindblom's contributions to this tradition are of major sig-
nificance. His ethical position closely resembles Jeremy Bentham's utili-
tarian calculus. According to Lindblom, individuals have different, often 
5 Ibid., pp. 4, 28. Cf. James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Political Ethos 
Revisited." American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971), pp. 1048-
1062. Wilson and Banfield identify two opinion groups in contemporary American 
which they call "holists" and "localists." The holist view is said to be associated with 
middle-class Anglo Saxon Protestant origins whereas the other view is combined 
with an immigrant, working-class ethos. The unitarist view stresses community ser-
vice, the public interest, honesty, obligation to assume civic responsibilities and im-
partiality in law enforcement . The localists favor people-helping items, increases 
in welfare payments and people-h elping conceptions as the primary function of a 
governmental system. 
6 Ibid., pp. 289, 15. Cf. Murray Eldleman, Politics As Symbolic Action: Mass 
Arousal and Quiescence ( Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 46, 69, 
81, 51, Eldleman presents an individualistic-psychological interpretation of the role 
that political discussion performs in a democratice society, According to his view, dis-
cussion helps deviates to accept policy defects, and opponents to adjust to disliked 
decisions. Political speeches appeal to deep-seated anxieties impulses, fears, needs, 
desires and urges. "It appears that those who can be expected to benefit substantially 
in status or money from belief in a myth are especially susceptible; they are inclined 
to translate their interests in status and money into the terms of a myth that defines 
their behavior as serving the public interest," 
7 Ibid ., pp. 114, 162. 
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conflicting, values which are not equal. "Good" political decisions require 
clarification of stable key values and involve difficult serious thought 
about how values are linked with perferred public policy decisions. The 
formulation of "well-considered" values requires leadership. 8 Values can 
also be collective, and widely shared, in contrast with private particular 
values. He ,asserts that it is impossible to formulate an aggregate defi-
nition of the public interest. 9 
Universal or general political criteria such as majority preference or 
equality are inadequate or ,ambiguous and of no help in solving complex 
problems of public policy formulation. He does recognize the existence 
of what Lindblom calls conventions and the rules of the game. 
It might be suggested, then, that the overwhelming commitment to 
democracy of, say, American citizens takes the form of verbal com-
mitment to loose and abstract principles that are quite inadeq uate 
for application, and of habits of political behavior that proximate ly 
support democratic government. Given the habits repression is at a 
minimum, and government is consented to even in the absence of 
consensus on less loose and abstr,act principles. 10 
In this situation where no really useful common standards of ethics exist, 
the partisan is one who makes decisions calculated to serve his own good 
or his definition of the public interest. According to Lindblom: 
... there are no bedrock social preferences or social values; every 
value held is a product of and is continuously reconsidered in the 
light of existing circumstances, especially those that bear on the 
probability of our satisfying our preferences.11 
Since individuals have interests which conflict and since there are no 
generally accepted criteria, guidelines, general ethical principles or rules, 
co-ordination should be achieved by means of "mutual partisan adjust-
ment" rather than by force . Any common values are created in this gov-
ernment by consent. Lindblom concludes that the only other alternati ves 
for the achievement of agreement, a social-political contract having been 
omitted , would be either central direction or a non-democratic govern-
ment. The co-operative discussion process model with its shared common 
value system or code, he thinks, necessarily requires a chief co-ordinator, 
or a highly centralized, non-democratic, administrative state. Among the 
8 Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence Of Democracy: Decision-Making Through 
Mutual Adjustment (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 270. 
o Ibid., pp . 277, 283, 286, 287. 
10 Ibid., p. 263. 
11 Ibid., p. 209. 
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many devices be considers to attain a public decision in the face of con-
flicting interests and views are negotiation, bargaining and partisan dis-
cussion. Negotiation, Lindblom says, includes appeals, threats and prom-
ises. Discussion involves a reappraisal of partisan interests and the means 
to satisfy them. ·Partisan mutual adjustment arises when no common val-
ues can be formulated for testing public policies .12 Partisan discussion is 
defined as: 
... A form of partisan mutual adjustment in which X, as a recognized 
condition of making his own decision effective, induces a response 
from Y by effecting through communications a reappraisal by Y of 
his partisan interests and the means to satisfy those without X's actu-
ally altering the objective consequences for Y of any of his possibl,e 
responses, where Y may or may not, in a symmetrical relation, do the 
same with respect to X.18 
partisan mutual adjustment by means of discussion promotes agreement 
on values by modification elimination and creation of values so that con-
flict between them can be replaced by co-ordination, consent and agree-
ment. According to Lindblom, this process involves weighing diHerent 
values against each other, appropriately sacrificing amounts of some val-
ues to others and recognizing that not all values are equal. 14 Values are 
counted differently according to the authority or position held by the 
participants, and they alter from situation to situation. The more widely 
shared a value, interest or preference, the heavier its weight in partisan 
adjustment. In addition, Lindblom thinks the intensity with which a 
value is held by an individual is added to this calculus. 15 Decisions 
reached this way promote stability agreement, action, democratic decen-
tralization and moderation 
The defects of co-operative discussion Lindblom mentions are that 
it requires a centralized co-ordinator and it assumes that people wholly 
accept and do not resist the centralist's decisions when discussion fails. 
According to Lindblom, paralysis in political decision-making ensues if 
one attempts to reach agreement on p1ior values rather than on specific 
policy statements whereas specific policy decisions can be achieved with 
general consent even if people differ on general value standards. Co-op-
erative discussions are muddy and leave values poorly understood, ill-
defined, and abstract. It produces rigidity in thinking which precludes 
shifting or abandoning values, and the variety of appeals is limited. The 
12 Ibid., pp. 55, 74, 263. 
18 Ibid., p. 71. Italics in original. 
14 Ibid., pp. 207, 244. 
111 Ibid., pp. 227, 235, 237, 240, 242, 244. 
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group is paralyzed until it finds values on which it is willing to declare 
its agreement. 16 
The modem individualist tradition starting from the realistic pr emise 
that men are motivated in their political actions and decisions by the 
pursuit of self-interest draws the conclusion that there is no such entity 
as a common good. However, recognizing some need for sufficient agree-
ment to make collective action possible, ,all of the theorists here consid-
ered suggest such devices unanimity, weak consensus about democracy, 
support for the rules of the game, and also conventional supp ort for the 
basic principles of the Judeo-Christian religions. Lindblom suggests the 
utilization of what he calls partisan mutual adjustment and discussion 
where no common values exists as a basis for public policies. Lindblom's 
model, in view of his ,acceptance of the proposition of a society with no 
common values, is a brilliant effort to provide some workable solution to 
the very serious problem of how such a society is to provide for any 
public policy without resorting to coercive governmental implementation 
of policies upon individuals whose values may differ sharply . The empiri-
cal problem of whether any society or government actually exists where 
there are no common values, no consensus or convention is ,another issue. 
But, let us now tum to the case presented by the ancient communa lists. 
III 
Ancient Communalism 
In the ancient Greek polis, political oratory flourished, decisions in 
the assembly flowed from public discussions, and the art of verba l com-
munication developed from a skill to an art and then was formulated 
by Aristotle into a science. Perhaps the Greeks were so interes ted in the 
art of decision-making by discussion precisely because the ir political 
system originated prior to the invention of the printing press an d the 
computer. My analysis of ancient communalism starts with a brief con-
sideration of Plato's Gorgias and Phaedrus as representative of th e co-
operative discussion position . This study of the ancients also includes 
parts of Plato's Republic ,and Aristotle's Rhetoric. Despite the important 
philosophic differences between Plato and Aristotle on many issues, here 
I consider them as mutual participants in a continuously developing tra-
dition . From this prospective Aristotle's Rhetoric is viewed as establish-
ing a "science" to replace the abuses of the Sophists stressed by Plato. 
This "new science" was first suggested as an intellectua l pro ject ,by Plato 
in the Phaedrus. Plato's Republic provide s us with a symbolic model of 
16 Ibid., pp. 108, 140, 220, 221, 222. 
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the ideal discussion process. I conclude this section with a summary of 
the essential propositions in the ancient communal model which assumes 
the existence of a common good and prefers the co-operative discussion 
process. 
In Plato's Gorgias we find the fust philosophic investigation of rhe-
toric . It is defined ,as "the ability to persuade with words judges in law 
courts , senators in the Senate, assembly men in the Assembly, and men 
in any other meeting which convenes for the public interests." 17 Whereas 
the philosopher is concerned with dialectic, logic and discussion, the 
student of rhetoric investigates the art of persuasion. 18 The good teacher 
of rhetoric need not be a Sophist, according to Plato. A true rhetorician 
must fust be a just man who seeks the common good rather than bis own 
privat e interest. The man who teaches only with a view to promoting his 
own self-interest and without regard for the truth does not serve the wel-
fare of the community. The primary responsibility of the statesman is the 
improvement of his fellow citizens without toadying to their lowest de-
sires. Teachers ,of rhetoric should realize that discussions need to be con-
ducted without destroying the bonds of friendship which are necessary 
in ord er to maintain communal cohesion and order. According to •Plato, 
the cosmos, heaven, and earth are held together by the virtue of sharing, 
by friendship , self-control and justice. 19 Political discussants should re-
member that these important ends place limits upon verbal exchanges. 
In the Phaedrus, Plato claims that any adequate science of rhetoric 
must fust be concerned with the analysis of the soul or psychology. One 
should investigate what kinds of discussion affect which types of per-
sonality and why persuasion works with some persons and not with 
others. He dismisses other contemporary studies of rhetoric as defective 
becau se they are not in his estimation "scientific." The student of rhetoric 
should proc eed to try out his theories by testing them against his sense 
experiences. Plato outlines high standards to be met ,by any future stu-
dent of rhetoric. 
But it is only wh en he can state adequately what sort of man is per-
suad ed by what sort of speech; when he has the capacity to decl are 
himself ,with complete perception, in the presence of another , that 
here is th e man and here the nature that was discussed theoretically 
at school-here, now, present to him in actuality-to which be must 
apply this kind of speech in this sort of manner in order to obtain 
17 Plato's Gorgias, trans. W. C. Helmbold (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952), 
p.10. 
18 Jbid, p. 24. 
19 Ibid., p. 83. 
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persuasion for this kind of activity-it is only when he can do all 
this and when he has, in ,addition , grasped the concept of propr iety 
of time-when to speak and when to hold his tongue , when to use 
and when not to use brachylogy, in a word, each of the specific de-
vices of discourse he may have studied-it is only then .and not until 
then that the finishing and perfecting touches will have been given 
to his science.20 
Socrates and his friends in The Republic state what I take to be 
Plato's answer to the evil of sophistry . Socratic dialectical discussion is 
proposed as the ideal mode for philosophic and political inquiry. Wha t, 
briefly, is philosophic discussion, what is the dialetical method , who can 
participate in discussion , what ,are the prerequisites for philosophic dis-
cussion? Discussion requires adherence to basic logical rules in order to 
construct good definitions and to provide a common understanding of the 
terms used. This, Plato thinks, is a necessary preliminary step in the con-
struction of an argument or case. To learn to discuss is a difficult thing, a 
skill or art which involves comprehending your fellow participant's po-
sition prior to attempting its refutation. One has first to listen and un-
derstand.21 Unexpressed common assumptions need to be made explic-
it. 22 When the participants reach ,agreement, the discussion may then 
proceed forward. Psychological attitudes are important. If one is not 
capable of discussion without extreme anger or emotional disturbance, 
he is not fit for or able to discuss philosophical questions fruitfully. One 
must not assume he knows all of the answers •before the discussion be-
gins; discussion is not a trick game of sophomores refuting each other. 
Plato writes one must be a mature adult with a balanced personality, 
sufficient interest and a mind open to reason. 23 Interpersonal agreeme nt 
between discussants is a means of checking the truthfulness of the defi-
nition , which should also meet tests of universality ,and logical consis-
tency.24 Maturity, wisdom, intelligence, fairness, honesty, temperanc e, 
moderation and courage are qualities needed to be a good discussant. 
Questions must be put fairly, no possible answers should be eliminated 
before the pursuit is begun, one agrees only if he honestly agrees . If a 
discussant changes his mind in the course of a discussion, he should point 
20 Plato's Phaedrus, trans. by W. C. Helmbold and W. C. Rabinowitz (New 
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956) , p. 64. 
21 Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. by Allan Bloom ( New York, Basic Books, 
1968). 
22 Ibid., 335b. 
2s Ibid., 539d. 
24 Ibid., 336e. 
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this out to the others. 25 One should eliminate abusive personal attacks, 
speech should be prec~se, and a serious inte~t shoul~ motivate. him f~r 
"what we seek is genU1De agreement concermng the nnportant issues m 
life." 26 Discussion also requires the right kind of emotive environment: 
a mood of extreme hostility between disputants impedes interchange be-
tween truth-seekers. A friendly, trusting, receptive sympathetic audience 
is best.27 
According to Plato there are important differences between a debate 
and a philosophic discussion. 
" ow,'' I said, "if we should speak at length against him, setting 
speech against speech, telling how many good things belong to be-
ing just and then he should speak in return, and we again, there'll 
be need of counting the good things and measuring how many each 
of us has in each speech, and then we'll be in need of some sort of 
judges who will decide. But if we consider just as we did a moment 
ago, coming to agreement with one another we'll ourselves be both 
judges and pleaders at once." 28 
In the discussion process one seeks the consent of other persons. Here the 
discussants combine the functions of advocate and judge and proceed by 
asking questions, discussing problems and reaching agreement on first 
points before proceeding to the second. Superficial, compact answers or 
slogans are not acceptable. One looks deeper into issues, knows, elabo-
rates and discusses premises, draws accurate conclusions from premises, 
rejects absurd conclusions and defective, deficient definitions and 
searches for the most universal definition. 29 
In summary, Plato establishes the points that discussion is different 
from debate, that it has prerequisites and rules, that it begins with proper 
definitions of terms and that it requires a certain personality type. A 
final conclusion he reaches is that the restoration of the art of philosophic 
discussion is an essential plank in his reform program for Greek democ-
racy. Plato vigorously criticizes the typical meeting of the democratic 
assembly. He suggests several ways to improve public discussion with 
the hope that division, discord, disunity and hostility would be replaced 
by friendly agreement upon wise solutions to difficult problems pro-
duced after extensive consideration. 
25 Ibid., 337b, 339b, 340c, 342d. 
26 Ibid., 350e, 351a, 350d. 
21 Ibid., 450d, 451a, b. 
28 Ibid., 348a. 
29 Ibid., 368. 
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'When," I said, "many gathered together sit down in assemblies 
courts, theaters, army camps , or any other common meeting of th; 
multitude, and with a great deal of uproar , blame some of the things 
said or done, and praise others , both in excess, shouting and clap-
ping; and besides, the rocks and the very place surrounding them 
echo and redouble the uproar of blame and praise." 80 
A government in which decisions are reached by reasoned discussion re-
quires that persons determined to rule by persuasion rather than by 
force predominate in the community. They should possess the requis ite 
abilities and skills to rule by means of discussion. In Book Eight Plato 
concludes that rule by reason is not possible where untrained per sons 
predominate, which he assumes would be the case in a direct participa-
tory democracy. He has set his standards for philosophic discussion so 
high that its achievement would require a regime controlled by speci-
ally educated philosopher kings. Plato saw a relationship between the 
spread of sophistry and the decline of the polis and proposed the teach-
ing of skills in philosophic discussion as a restorative measure. Howe ver, 
philosopher kings are different from political orators and disputants in 
the rough and tumble every day decision-making about public policy . 
Aristotle reshapes philosophical discussion into an instrument more 
suited to the realities of politics. Political science should include a care-
ful study of the art of verbal persuasion because it is the major means 
utilized by the politician to gain his ends. So the Rhetoric, often ne-
glected by political theorists, is the necessary companion volume to the 
Politics and the Ethics. In the Rhetoric Aristotle asks; if rational speech 
is more distinctive of man than the use of physical force, should he be 
more ashamed of himself if he cannot defend himself with speech than 
if he fails to defend himself with arms? 81 It is the art of public speaking, 
concerned with the methods of persuasion and demonstration, which 
teaches a man how to influence the decisions of the lawgivers, the mem-
bers of assemblies and juries. According to Aristotle , there are three 
major areas of persuasion; first, by means of influence of the speaker's 
personal character; second, by manipulation of the listener's emotions; 
and third, by means of the content of a speech where the truth is pr oven 
by means of argument. 32 Both ethical and rhetorical studies are related 
to political science, and are different from the dialectical argumenta tion 
utilized by philosophers. 
so Ibid ., 492c. 
81 Aristotle: Rhetoric, trans . by W. Rhuys Roberts and Poetics, trans. by Ingram 
Bywater (New York: Modem Library , 1954), 1355b. 
82 Ibid., 135 6a-b. 
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The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate 
upon without arts, or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons 
who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a 
long chain of reasoning. Tihe subjects of our deliberation are such 
as seem to present us with alternative possibilities; about things 
that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other 
than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his 
time in deliberation. 83 
The orator is concerned with things to be done in the future and 
urges people either to do or not to do something. Political speeches, 
therefore, aim at proving either the expediency or good, or the harmful-
ness or evil, of actions. 34 Just and good deeds are actions done for the 
sake of others or for one's benefactors. 85 
Aristotle speculates that 11hetoric is a combination of the science of 
logic and political ethics with a dash of sophistical reasoning added for 
spice. There are five main subject areas for political speakers. These are 
ways and means, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, 
and legislation. 36 According to him, assertive, self-seeking makes friend-
ship difficult if not impossible. Aristotle writes that in his estimation the 
political speaker's aim is utility, to determine not ends but the means to 
ends, i.e., what it is useful to do. In politics, he thinks, goodness and 
utility are synonymous. 
In Book I of the Rhetoric Aristotle systematically relates the omtor's 
art to other areas of knowledge. The projected model of the skilled po-
litical leader is very different from either the philosopher king, the states-
man, or the Chicago boss. He is preeminently a man of experience, rea-
son and practicality. Yet he also retains his nobility and humor. Here the 
role of political science is educational since the most important and ef-
fective qualification for successful persuasion is to be well-informed 
about different governmental systems. In addition, the politician needs 
to understand what other people's interests are since this is a key to in-
ducing them to formulate favorable decisions.87 The study of social ethics 
assists him by lending information by means of which he can direct his 
appeals to the particular moral characteristics of different cultures. 
In Book II of the Rhetoric, Aristotle aims to teach an aspiring leader 
how to influence a group to make decisions he thinks best. The three keys 
33 Ibid., 1357c. 
84 Ibid., 1359. 
85 Jbid., 1366-1367a. 
86 Ibid ., 1362a. 
37 Ibid ., 1365-1366. 
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to success in this project are good sense, good moral character and good 
will .38 An additional subject matter to be mastered is psychology -the 
analysis of the human motivational-emotional structure, or knowledge of 
the soul. The remainder of this book contains his analysis of the logical 
elements involved in political discussions, which are muoh too complex 
for detailed consideration here.89 In general Aristotle says that all effec-
tive arguments are founded upon an adequate knowledge of the facts 
and the subject-matter. 
In summary, I would like to re-formulate ancient communalism into 
five propositions. First, civic virtue and public standards for policy de-
cisions are to be based upon rational consideration of group interes t and 
the common good which is assumed to exist. Second, political leade rship 
should be by means of rational peaceful discussion which assumes some 
qualifications , ability and training in the art and science of rhetoric, an 
important division of political science. Third, a healthy state of co-op-
erative discussion is said to be vitally necessary for the continue d well-
being of the polis. Discussions must be conducted without dest roying 
the bonds of friendship. Excessive vituperation, bitterness an d person-
alized attacks are beyond the limits of permissible modes of discussion. 
Assertive self-seeking destroys friendship and hence tends to un dermine 
the unity necessary to a polis. Fourth, the ancient authors knew the ef-
fects of partisan discussion or sophistry but asserted that it prn duced 
bad results, destructive of the public interest and disruptive of and de-
structive of unity. And, filth, they recognized the existence of dishonor-
able ,dishonest politicians who pandered ,to the lowest interests of the 
public in order to promote their own self-interest. 
IV 
Conclusion 
A striking contrast in political theories now confronts us. The ancient 
model presupposed strong bonds of societal friendship with skilled dis-
cussants co-operatively devising resolutions for public differences in ac-
cord with a common good; whereas the modem-individualistic model as-
sumes a group of self-interested individuals who recognize no common 
ethical standards trading off individual assets in order to forge an ac-
ceptable solution. Yet there are some common assumptions in the two 
positions despite the manifest differences. For example, both models 
recognize that some method of resolving disagreements about policy is 
as Ibid ., 1378. 
so Ibid., 1391-2. 
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needed. Both presuppose that men even with the best of intentions and 
even granted widely accepted ethical standards will not always agree 
about what policy would, in this specific case, best promote the welfare 
of the community . Secondly, both models exhibit a preference for de-
centralized government ,and rationally derived policy decisions. In ad-
dition there is the assertion that abstract definitions of majority rnle and 
equality are of ve1y little utility in devising specific policies. There are 
vaiying degrees of admission among the writers studied above that po-
litical systems operate within the oontext of social convention or within 
the limitations, as in America, of religious standards . The last assumption 
held in common by these theorists is that highly centralized , administra-
tive states require a single co-ordinator. This, it is claimed, results in 
irrational , rigid decisions potentially destructive of freedom because such 
a system would be beyond the intellectual oapacities of one man. Co-
ordinated, rational planning in the highly centralized, administrative 
state is a myth. 
The most important areas of disagreement may be formulated into 
the following series of propositions: 
1. The standards found in a society's religion and constitutional mo-
rality do not provide any operational basis for making specific pol-
icy decisions. The only possible standard is individual self-interest; 
2. It is possible to formulate a political model in which no general 
ethics are posited since there are no useful common standards ap-
plicable to policy decisions; 
3. Decisions and values have to be created by politicians in a negoti-
ated trnde; 
4. Co-operative discussion is not the preferred method of reaching 
decisions; and 
5. Co-operative discussion within the context of a society in which 
agreement about some fundamental ethics exists cannot co-exist 
with either decentralized or free government 
A fundamental axiom of the co-operative-ancient position is that 
the primary obligation of the politician is the pursuit of the common in-
terest. To say that most men are motivated only by the desire to secure 
power , money and prestige may be tantamount to asserting that, from 
another moral perspective, all politicians are evil . This pessimistic as-
sumption would preclude the possibility of any statesmen providing 
virtuous leadership for a society. The classical view that civic viltue de-
rives from dedication to the common good, that disinterested service to 
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the community is noble and statesman-like, and that some men ,are capa-
•ble of self-sacrifice, hence, political virtue seems a better position . 
In addition , excessive promotion of self-interest undermines unity 
and retards the process of reaching decisions. Aristotle insists that pro-
motion of individualistic interests d estroys societal dispersion of friend-
ship. The totally self-interested public man would become bogged down 
in endless negotiations to construct a winning coalition in the assembly 
or cabinet. One envisions much time wasted , endless delays and stale-
mates , and insufficient agreement to expedite the public business . After, 
all, why should I compromise or h·ade away any portion of my own in-
dividual self-interest in order to further co-operation and ,advancement of 
public policy? Stalemate would result because it is difficult to imagine a 
situation in which a continuous series of decisions could be mutually 
beneficial to the perceived self-interests of the individuals participa ting 
in the bargains. 
Turning to the second area of disagreement , the projection of an 
operational governmental mod el in which no general standards exist, the 
pressing question is: Could any political system work in which there are 
no ethical criteria except economic or individual self-inter est? Perhaps 
such a system might function , but not , in my estimation, withou t some 
application of force because there would not be sufficient volunta1y sup-
port for its use in the community . Why, for example , should I, John Doe, 
be obligated to support and pay for X policy made by a group of self-
interested administrators in order to promote their self-interests? What 
standards would be utilized in reaching a prior agreement about how 
to make decisions, ,and how would one preclude endless debate over how 
things are going to be decided in a partciular case. If politicians are to 
discuss endlessly and to make bargains or h·ades promoting their self-
interest and in the process to create "ethical standards," then it ,app ears 
to me that the model government would grind to a halt. 
Another problem with the "no general standards" model concern& 
the ethical basis for majority rule as a decision-making device in elec-
tions, ,a legislature or an administrative bureau. For how can one rema in 
a unique person with radically individualistic interests and rea lly dif-
ferent ethical principles , and also simultaneously be a part of a majority 
committed to obey the laws of the land? Surely paralysis would -again 
result simply because ( especially where the rule of unanimity is applied 
as the only logical solution to the above dilemma) few or no decisions 
supported by a majority could ever be made. 
In addition, public discussion in a legislature or cabinet may be an 
essentially different process from that involved in making economic deals 
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in which the victory goes to the strongest coalition of sel£sh interests. 
Many public policy issues might involve problems that do not relate to 
"interest," a concept which is rather ill-defined and ambiguous. The dis-
cussion process as prescribed by Plato and Aristotle involving men think-
ing together in order to come up with ,adequate answers to pressing pub-
lic problems is the alternative which leaves room for the possibility of 
decisions based upon pursuit of the common good or justice . All might 
be said to have an equal stake in working closely and co-operatively to-
gether in an atmosphere of friendship in an effort to discover the best 
possible solutions. This model requires some leaders of intellectual and 
moral stature who assist in the application and explication of the com-
munities appropriate moral standards. In other words, the moral rubric 
thou shalt not steal is not automatically self-enforcing nor is it a simple 
matter to apply in a criminal legal code for a complex industralized so-
ciety. But, what modem society could continue to function without an 
elaborate mechanism enforcing the simple maxim? 
The third proposition in dispute raises serious problems for a demo-
cratic society. The ancient-communalist accepted the idea of the god-
like lawgiver, a Solon or Moses, who formulated their primary moral 
laws. Hence is brought into question the role of the politician as the cre-
ator of values. Two points are at stake: the extent of participation by 
other societal members in devising general mores or ethics if the com-
munity is to be democratic and decentaralized; and the specific problem 
of relegating the function of value creation to politicians. It would ap-
pear ithat the modern-individualistic model blurs the distinctions be-
tween the philosopher-scholar, the churchman-eithicist and the statesman-
politician. Too great a responsibility is placed upon the average politi-
cian when one .asks him to create values by means of deals in the process 
of trying to work out suitable compromises for the polis. Moreover, ethi-
cal standards or rules of some so1t may be needed at all stages of the 
policy formulation process and may well be a prerequisite for peaceful 
mutual negoti-ations. 
Paradoxically, there is a recognition of the need for a statement of 
ethical standards to guide the politician's specific policy formulations. 
In a democratic society these rules should emerge from the hearts of the 
people, from the souls of those with religious convictions, and from the 
minds of the philosophers. Surely the politician should be in the busi-
ness of performing the complex task of taking these standards and de-
mands .and formulating the specific details of public policy, of suggest -
ing means, not ends, as Aristotle suggests. If the politicians -create values 
and attempt to impose policies upon a community in which no concen-
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sus about their validity exists, then coercion might be required to en-
force these laws. 
The merits of co-operative discussion are legion . It holds forth the 
possibility of reducing violent and hateful, interpersonal exchanges 
about controversial ideals and policies. Indeed, if agreement cannot be 
reached without provoking excessive anger, one would assume that the 
wise political decision is to stop pressing that issue, and not take any 
action until peaceful, rational discussion becomes possible. I would urge 
the utilitaiian consideration that one should not waste time discussing 
policies that will be violently opposed or received very little support . 
Co-operative discussion does not create paralysis, irrationality, abstract -
ness; rather it may clear the way for a more realistic estimation of the 
possible within the limitations imposed in the given context and promote 
peaceful, friendly, serious consideration of what constitutes good public 
policy. Disunity and division might be reduced, and persuasion given 
more chance to prevail over coercion, threat or force. The role of the 
politician might be reduced to formulating means to achieve agreed 
upon ends, leaving the realm of ethics to the philosopher, the theorist, 
the humanist and the churchman. Intelligent public policy might then 
be devised by politicians, nay statesmen. 
And fifth, the assumption that co-operative discussion requires a 
centralized state needs to be challenged. Is there not an alternative which 
might prove to be more desirable than either the radical individualistic 
or the iigidly collectivistic models? Quite clearly the closed, compact 
commun~ties of ancient Greece are a thing of the past. The Puiitan effort 
to create Christian commonwealthes in a new land floundered upon the 
rocks of religious discord and pluralism. Yet the medieval Christian com-
munity was highly localistic, and the Greek city-state was decentralize d. 
Aristotle in the Politics presents examples of a variety of small systems. 
In the pre-modem era there was a plethora of decentralized systems, 
parochial, viable, local communities. Surely, members of a strong, local 
community who are wrestling with disputed matters of public policy 
have a better possibility of reaching a solution acceptable to the major-
ity of citizens than does a central administrator attempting the impos-
sible task of formulating a uniform policy for a society full of divergent 
interests and views. The co-operative discussion process should work 
best in a decentralized system where some agreement concerning the 
common interest still exists. To the contrary one wonders if any serious 
discussion is possible in or promoted by highly centralized governments 
in large countries? The conclusion is reached that co-operative discus-
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sion and viable concepts of the general interest are most likely to exist 
in a decentralized system and, therefore, this model does not correspond 
with a centralized, administrative governmental system. 
And last , we reconsider the point with which this essay began, the 
correlation between democracy and discussion . At issue is what kind of 
discussion process most closely -corresponds with a democratic decision-
making process. It has been assumed that there is an inter-relationship 
between the way decisions are reached and reasonable, democratic gov-
ernment. Unfortunately democmtic theories which emphasize majority 
rule as its typical characteristic tend to end up talking about numbers 
and counting. The assumption follows that x is the democratic decision 
simply because more or at least fifty percent plus one of the participants 
support it. In the last analysis this type of majority rule is reduced to the 
claim one is obligated to support the rnles of tlie majority because there 
are more of them and they are stronger than we are . The majority is 
right because it is more numerous. Both the partisan-individualistic and 
ancient-communalistic models are an essentially different approach to 
democratic theory. They stress the importance of making decisions by 
peaceful means in which decisions are authorized because they result 
from a process which is rational. The merit of the individualistic model 
is that it points to a calculated effort to play off considemtions of eco-
nomic and individual self-interest in a bargaining process. The ancient-
communalistic model emphasizes adjusting different opinions about what 
policy best promotes the common interest. The point these theorists make 
is that by means of protracted fruitful consultations about alternative 
ideas, the majority has been convinced that their preferences best cor-
respond with a public good . Therefore, in a situation where disagree-
ments arise over choices, all are obligated to support ,the decision of the 
majority because more of them think that this policy is for the good of all. 
